In the corridors of power in Togo, a seismic shift in governance is stirring: the transition from a presidential system to a quasi-parliamentary one. 



This constitutional metamorphosis, if enacted, marks the third of its kind and is tantamount to a coup d’état,coup d’état, according to Boris Toble, a Togolese citizen and barrister at the Paris Bar.



The process of amendment has been tainted from inception to conclusion. The foundational law of Togo, ratified by referendum on September 27, 1992, and promulgated on October 14, 1992, subsequently revised on December 31, 2002, February 7, 2007, and May 15, 2019, delineates the provisions for any constitutional change.

The clauses concerning amendment, as outlined in Title XIII - On Revision - particularly Article 144, and those pertaining to the election of the President of the Republic in Title IV - On Executive Power - especially Article 59, reveal the inherent impossibility of altering Togo’s political regime through parliamentary means without corrupting the procedure both in form and substance.


The flawed procedure in form: What constitutes the constitutional amendment process?

“Art.144: The initiative to revise the Constitution is jointly held by the President of the Republic and at least one-fifth (1/5) of the members of the National Assembly. The draft or proposal for revision is deemed adopted if it secures a four-fifths (4/5) majority of the Assembly’s members. Failing this majority, the draft or proposal adopted by a two-thirds (2/3) majority is submitted to a referendum. The President of the Republic may submit any constitutional bill to a referendum. No revision process may be initiated or continued during an interim period or vacancy, or when the territorial integrity is under threat. The republican form and secular nature of the state are not subject to revision.”


 Article 144 sets the terms for revision, granting this prerogative to one-fifth of the deputies or the President.

The contentious reform was thus initiated by the deputies in accordance with the prevailing constitution. However, these deputies’ terms ended on December 31, 2023. As they continue to serve three months past their tenure, their role should be to manage routine affairs, not to undertake significant changes with potentially profound effects.





They are in an interim period awaiting the election of new deputies. Furthermore, Article 144 stipulates that no revision process can be initiated or continued during an interim or vacancy.


The first flaw is thus established! But let’s assume, for argument’s sake, that the deputies, despite their expired terms, could amend the Constitution. Can they legislate reforms across all provisions? The flawed procedure in substance: Certain domains reserved by the current Constitution can only be altered via referendum. This is the essence of Article 59, which states: “Art. 59: The President of the Republic is elected by universal, free, direct, equal, and secret suffrage for a five (05) year term, renewable once. This clause can only be changed through a referendum.”